Parnas/ Sass Ipseity model of schizophrenia spectrum disorders

 

In the Parnas/ Sass model the ‘self’ is a concept that is divided into the minimal/ core/ ipseity self and more complex notions of selfhood such as the narrative/ social self (Nelson, Parnas & Sass, 2014, 2014: 479). The minimal/core/ ipseity self is

“prereflective, tacit level of selfhood. It refers to the implicit first-person quality of consciousness” (Nelson, Parnas & Sass, 2014, 2014: 479).

It is in the background of all conscious experience which is infused with ‘mine-ness’  and is the “first person perspective on the world” (Sass & Parnas, 2003: 429). It is the foundation of all more complex levels of selfhood such as the narrative/ social self . The narrative/ social self is

“characteristics such as social identity, personality, habits, style, personal history, etc” (Nelson, Parnas & Sass, 2014: 2014, 479).

The core disturbance of schizophrenia in the Parnas/ Sass model is of ipseity (Sass & Parnas, 2003). We do not have to accept this argument just the observation that disturbances of ipseity are more commonly found in the schizophrenia spectrum compared to other psychosis cases . This disturbance of ipseity has three complementary aspects – hyperreflexivity, diminished self-affection and disturbed ‘hold’ or ‘grip’ – which are associated with schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Sass & Parnas, 2003; Nelson, Parnas & Sass, 2014 and Sass & Parnas, 2017).

“The first is hyperreflexivity, which refers to forms of exaggerated self-consciousness in which a subject or agent experiences itself, or what would normally be inhabited as an aspect or feature of itself, as a kind of external object. The second is a diminishment of self-affection or auto-affection—that is, of the sense of basic self-presence, the implicit sense of existing as a vital and self-possessed subject of awareness…These complementary distortions are necessarily accompanied by certain kinds of alterations or disturbances of the subject's "grip" or "hold" on the conceptual or perceptual field…that is, of the sharpness or stability with which figures or meanings emerge from and against some kind of background context” (Sass & Parnas, 2003: 428).

These ipseity changes are

“pervasive, enduring trait-phenomena, typically dating back to childhood or early adolescence…”(Henriksen & Parnas, 2012: 659).

If you go to www.easenet.dk there’s a lot more information on this topic including papers 

 

REFERENCES

Henriksen, M.G. and Parnas, J., 2012. Clinical manifestations of self-disorders and the Gestalt of schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 38(4), pp.657-660

Nelson, B., Parnas, J. and Sass, L.A., 2014. Disturbance of minimal self (ipseity) in schizophrenia: clarification and current status. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 40(3), pp.479-482.

Sass, L.A. and Parnas, J., 2003. Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 29(3), pp.427-444.

Sass, L. and Parnas, J., 2017. Thought disorder, subjectivity, and the self. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 43(3), pp.497-502.

 

Notes on RD Laing "The Divided Self"

 

The schizophrenia spectrum encompasses both schizotypal or schizoid personality disorder and schizophrenia and related psychoses. These schizophrenia psychosis are distinguished from schizotypal/ schizoid personality disorder by the presence of notable and persistent psychotic symptoms (Laing, 1965: 17). The schizotypy concept – a distinct behavioural phenotype associated with increased risk for psychotic symptoms with empirical evidence supporting it (Linscott & Van Os, 2010) – is regarded as co-existent with the schizophrenia spectrum. This part will discuss RD Laing's model for disorders of self associated with the schizophrenia spectrum in particular. It will not focus on how these states develop or theoretical models of how psychotic symptoms develop from them.

Laing described ontological insecurity of loss of individual identity as an important feature of the schizophrenia spectrum which he refers to as the schizoid state (Laing, 1965: 39-46) where people have fear of engulfment (of identity by other individuals during interpersonal interactions), implosion (where the individual feels empty and reality threatens to invade and destroy them) and petrification (whereby someone’s autonomy is negated and they become objectified by another person).

This ontological insecurity leads to schizoid individuals protecting themselves by creating a ‘false self’ that interacts with the world. In most individuals a vital embodied self has real perceptions of or meaningful actions on the ‘other’ (such as other individuals or the external world). By contrast, schizoid individuals have an inner true self interacts with the world via a false self that has a generalised deadness and results in unreal perceptions of or futile actions on the ‘other’ (Laing, 1965: 78-82).

The inner self aims to protect itself from destruction by others but only results in this self losing any firm attachment to reality and becomes like a tenuous gas occupying this self, it “becomes unreal”, “empty, dead and split” and experiences strong negative angry emotions as result (Laing, 1965: 139-140). The split in the sense of self leads to problems distinguishing what is self and not-self including one’s own body, “disembodying  the sense of ‘I’” (Laing, 1965: 175). 

References

 

Laing, R.D., 1965. The divided self: An existential study in sanity and madness. Penguin: Middlesex, UK.

Linscott, R.J. and van Os, J., 2010. Systematic reviews of categorical versus continuum models in psychosis: evidence for discontinuous subpopulations underlying a psychometric continuum. Implications for DSM-V, DSM-VI, and DSM-VII. Annual review of clinical psychology, 6, pp.391-419.